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ABSTRACT 
This thesis postulates the need for a more proactive approach to cyber defense 
in Norway and offers recommendations about how Norway can be better 
prepared to counter cyber threats. It finds that Norway’s strategic infrastructure is 
vulnerable to cyber attacks and that Norway has no coherent strategy for 
meeting this challenge. The thesis argues that an effective cyber defense 
requires a wide range of offensive and defensive measures as well as a central 
authority for command and control. Norway must increasingly be perceived as a 
serious and tough player in cyberspace; this requires proactive thinking and 
offensive capabilities. An important first step would be to make the Ministry of 
Defense responsible for the nation’s cyber defense. 
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“We must try to identify which threats the nation will face in ten, 
fifteen years.” 
Head of Norwegian Cyber Defence,  
Major General Roar Sundseth, Aug 13, 2013 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will analyze the cyber threat environment confronting Norway’s 
Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). The intention is to assess whether Norway 
utilizes cyber defense resources in an optimal manner. The thesis will suggest 
ways to improve and enhance effectiveness in cyber defenses to better meet the 
rapid changes in cyberspace.  
Recognition of future challenges related to electronic threats was 
mentioned in official documents as early as 13 years ago. Since then, 
developments have been significant with respect to both the rapid expansion of 
technology and to the growing importance of the Internet and cyberspace. In 
Norway, the so-called Vulnerability Committee report from 2000 describes with 
foresight an upcoming change in technology: Especially interesting is the 
possibility of the use of new methods that can be given the paradoxical term “soft 
terrorism,” namely electronic means aimed at information and communication 
systems.1 The Committee report continues: “The risks of a devastating online 
attack are in many ways just as real as a more conventional military attack. 
There have been no reports of organized attacks carried out on a large scale, 
although there have been incidents in connection with the tense international 
                                            
1 Norges offentlige utredninger, (NOU) [Norwegian Official Reports] 2000:24, Et sårbart 
samfunn, Utfordringer for sikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeidet i samfunnet, 4 juli 2000 [A 




situation.”2 A more up-to-date parliamentary bill from 2012 describes the cyber 
threat as: 
Norwegian society and state security are challenged by threats 
related to the use of digital technology and the ability to spread and 
control information. Attack in the digital space, also referred to as 
“cyberspace,” is one of the fastest growing threats to individuals, 
businesses and public institutions. The attacks can come from both 
state and non-state actors, such as from other countries’ military 
defense, intelligence services, organized crime, terrorist and 
extremist groups, competing businesses and individual hackers. 
The most serious threat comes from states.3 
The Norwegian Intelligence Service 2012 annual report, “Focus,” 
envisions that cyberspace may become an arena that acquires an important role 
for crisis and conflict management. Several states are developing modern cyber 
capabilities to attack critical areas of society. Targets can be infrastructure, social 
activities or decision-making and information processes. The Great Powers have 
many instruments in their toolbox, operations in the cyber domain being one.4  
Despite knowledge and understanding of the threat in cyberspace, the 
assessment of the data security department, NorCERT (a part of the Norwegian 
National Security Authority (NSM)), is that the security status for 2012 is 
unsatisfactory.5  
 
                                            
2 Ibid., 39. 
3 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defence], St.prp. Nr 73 S (2011–2012) Et 
Forsvar for vår tid [The Ministry of Defence: A defence for our time, Parliamentary Bill no. 73 S 
(2011–2012)], 24, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37583840/PDFS/PRP201120120073000DDDPDFS.pdf. 
4 Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2012, 43. http://forsvaret.no/om-
forsvaret/organisasjon/felles/etjenesten/Documents/etj_lo-res.pdf. 
5 Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet [National Security Authority], Rapport om 




B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to critically evaluate Norwegian cyber 
security. First, the thesis examines developments in cyberspace, including 
developments in espionage and warfare capabilities, to show what type of actors 
use cyberspace as an arena of conflict. It also shows which technology is most 
commonly used for both offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace to 
provide an understanding of cyberspace as a venue that is distinct from other 
more traditional arenas of conflict. Because cyberspace has become a unique 
arena with unique threats, traditional thinking about defense in cyberspace is 
hardly appropriate. 
Second, to give an idea of the current threat, and how it is likely to develop 
in the future, this thesis focuses on China. China is the leading nation with 
respect to cyber espionage, a current and highly relevant threat to Norwegian 
high tech enterprises and critical infrastructure. A study of China’s cyber 
capabilities will also give an indication of how other individuals, groups or nations 
may be able to develop their own capabilities in the future. 
Third, open sources are studied to find how responsibility and 
preparedness in cyber defense is delegated in Norway. The findings indicate that 
Norway’s defense organization is fragmented with many actors without 
overarching or coordinating management.  
The cyber activities of criminals and organized crime gangs motivated by 
financial or material gain are excluded from this thesis.  
C. BACKGROUND  
To understand the extent and seriousness of what cyber war is, it is 
important to remember what such a war can be and how seriously the threat is 
perceived. In a speech in July 2012 at Intrepid Sea, Air and Space Museum in 
New York, U.S. Defense Secretary Panetta warned that the United States faces 
the possibility of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” and is increasingly vulnerable to foreign 
computer hackers who can dismantle the nation’s power grid, transportation 
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system, financial networks, and government.6 Reports from the Department of 
Homeland Security show that in a one-year period, 2010 to 2011, the number of 
attempted and successful cyber attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure—such 
as dams and energy and water systems—rose more than 383 percent.7  
Although the above is an assessment of the threat to the United States 
and not Norway, it is important to remember that the infrastructure in the two 
countries have many common features. Computers, Internet and network 
constitute a common denominator regardless of whether you are an American or 
a Norwegian. A variety of actors, some private, some state-sponsored, execute 
cyber exploitation and attacks on a daily basis against numerous targets around 
the world. Evidence from the last 10 years shows that nations like China, Russia 
and the United States have the capacity to conduct cyber war with significant 
results. The Russian cyber attacks on both Estonia and Georgia, for example, 
demonstrates emphatically that nations with such capability can be quite 
successful. The attack against Iran with Stuxnet8 shows how targeted actions 
against industrial control systems could have serious consequences for the 
nations that are exposed to them. Both the ability and the intent to attack in 
cyberspace form the basis for what we refer to as the cyber threat. 
D. THE THREAT TO NORWAY 
The questions are: Is there any cyber threat to Norwegian infrastructure? 
Is it conceivable that strategic interest in future conflicts will leave Norway caught 
between the great powers’ interests? While there are no certain answers to these 
                                            
6 Elisabeth Bumiller and Tom Shanker, “Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on 
U.S.,” The New York Times, October 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-
cyberattack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
7 Nicole Blake Johnson, “Report: Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure jump 383% in 2011,” 
Federal Times, July 3, 2012, 
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120703/IT01/307030004/Report-Cyber-attacks-critical-
infrastructure-jump-383–2011. 
8 STUXNET is a computer worm discovered in 2010, created to attack Iranian nuclear 
productions systems. 
 5 
questions, it is important to analyze nations’ ability and willingness to facilitate 
cyber attacks or to gather intelligence. In many cases, we see that cyberspace is 
an important supplement to traditional arenas of both war and intelligence 
collection. To give an idea of the complexity and scope of cyberspace, it may be 
interesting to study some different actors’ assessment of the challenges related 
to it: 
The McAfee Virtual Criminology Report 2009 Virtually Here: The Age of 
Cyber Warfare asserts:9 
If a major cyber conflict between nation states were to erupt, it is 
very likely that the private sector would get caught in the crossfire. 
Most experts agree that critical infrastructure systems—such as the 
electrical grid, banking and finance, and oil and gas sectors—are 
vulnerable to cyber attack in many countries.  
Some nation states are actively doing reconnaissance to identify 
specific vulnerabilities in these networks. In the words of one 
expert, nation states are “laying the electronic battlefield and 
preparing to use it.” 
In the case of Norway, the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) writes in 
the 2012 “Focus” publication: “Chinese authorities are using digital operations to 
a large degree as a replacement for human collection and often use proxies for 
obtaining information.”10 Both examples show a traditional conflict-orientated 
approach to the use of cyberspace. However, cyberspace can also be used for 
other purposes; in “China’s Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic 
Deterrence,” Danish scientist Magnus Hjortdal claims:”11 
China’s military strategists describe cyber capabilities as a powerful 
asymmetric opportunity in a deterrence strategy. Analysts consider 
                                            
9 McAfee, Virtual Criminology Report 2009 Virtually Here: “The Age of Cyber Warfare,,” 3, 
http://img.en25.com/Web/McAfee/VCR_2009_EN_VIRTUAL_CRIMINOLOGY_RPT_NOREG.pdf. 
10 Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2012, 44. http://forsvaret.no/om-
forsvaret/organisasjon/felles/etjenesten/Documents/etj_lo-res.pdf. 
11 Magnus Hjortdal, Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 4, Number 2, Summer 2011: 
Strategic Security in Article 2 the Cyber Age, “China’s Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets 
Strategic Deterrence,” 5, 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1101&context=jss. 
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that an “important theme in Chinese writings on computer network 
operations (CNO) is the use of computer-network attack (CNA) as 
the spear point of deterrence.” CNA increases the enemy’s costs to 
become too great to engage in warfare in the first place. 
Hjortdal puts cyber warfare in a context where the goal is not necessarily 
conflict, but conflict prevention through deterrence. Deterrence in cyberspace is 
an opportunity for nations that have well-developed cyber skills to openly let it be 
known that they have and will make use of these capabilities. In a later chapter it 
will be shown that a nation`s military capacity enhances its deterrence in 
cyberspace, but it is not essential.   
In a modern society where many challenges, contexts and interests are 
more closely intertwined than ever, Norway may be affected by peripheral 
conflicts. The fact that Norway—besides being a NATO member—is supplying 
the European powers with natural gas, could make Norway a target for groups or 
nations that are in conflict far away from its borders. This does not mean that the 
Norwegian infrastructure will be attacked or destroyed, but the threat alone can 
have a great effect if ample protection is unavailable. 
The extent to which a nation will use force will always be unclear; although 
military doctrines may provide some insight, they do not tell the whole and 
complete truth. It may, therefore, be interesting to see what Chinese officers write 
about warfare. In the book “Unrestricted Warfare” colonels Liang and Xiangsui 
write:12 
In terms of beyond-limits warfare, there is no longer any distinction 
between what is or is not the battlefield. Spaces in nature including 
the ground, the seas, the air, and outer space are battlefields, but 
social spaces such as the military, politics, economics, culture, and 
the psyche are also battlefields…. Warfare can be military, or it 
canbe quasi-military, or it can be non-military…. These 
characteristics of beyond-limits war are the watershed between it 
and traditional warfare, as well as the starting line for new types of 
warfare. 
                                            
12 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy 
America (Pan American Publishing Company (August 22, 2002), 206. 
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China’s capabilities and doctrines could provide an important indication of 
the progress in cyber warfare that can be expected in the future.  
For Norway, the challenges remain unchanged, regardless of who 
constitutes the threat, or in what form it materializes.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can Norway best counter threats in cyberspace? 
F. METHODOLOGY 
To answer the research question, the thesis explores the following claims: 
• Cyberspace has become an arena of warfare at tactical, 
operational and strategical level. 
• Cyberspace is a venue that will have a substantial role in crisis and 
conflict. 
• The major powers are preparing to use digital operations as a tool 
in conflict resolution, primarily alongside other more traditional 
measures. 
• Threats in cyberspace have changed, and Norway is not prepared.  
• The primary state actors behind threats in cyberspace are foreign 
intelligence and security services. 
• Cyber power can be used to produce preferred outcomes within 
cyberspace.13 
• China has the most extensive cyber-espionage capability in the 
world. 
• China currently conducts extensive cyber operations worldwide. 
• Several communities are acquiring expertise in intrusion and 
influence of the overall electronic control systems (SCADA) of the 
critical infrastructure. 
• Norway’s CNI could be a potential target as a part on a beyond-
limits warfare approach. 
• Norwegian cyber defense lacks central management and one 
responsible ministry. 
• Norway’s role as supplier of natural gas is vulnerable to cyber 
attacks. 
                                            
13 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 113. 
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• A defensive posture is not necessarily the best way of protecting a 
country in cyberspace. 
The five remaining chapters of the thesis are designed to substantiate 
these claims and answer the research question. The analysis is based on 
qualitative research of both empirical and conceptual literature on cyber warfare 
and related topics. 
As background for the understanding of how cyberspace has developed, 
Chapter II describes the essential elements of cyberspace. The discussion 
assumes that security is a prerequisite for all work in cyberspace, either as an 
individual who sends email or as a nation that will defend vital infrastructure. The 
chapter builds the theoretical foundation for later understanding of the 
complexities of cyber both in terms of attack and defense, cyber threat and cyber 
power.  
Chapter III describes how states perceive cyber power, why states invest 
in cyber technology and how cyber power can be used. The chapter also 
describes the various theories of cyber power and how cyber can be used to 
support military operations. 
Chapter IV deals with China’s growing cyber capabilities, including the 
rate of its cyber operations. China’s capacity and capabilities in the cyber domain 
are discussed and put into a frame that can give insight into how the cyber 
domain is likely to be developed in the future. 
Chapter V describes Norway’s cyber strategy, cyber defenses and 
distribution of labor.  
Chapter VI summarizes the preceding analyses and discussions and 
argues for changes in the cyber defenses. 
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II. CYBERSPACE: DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW DOMAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to provide an understanding of what cyberspace is. 
Some argue: “After land, sea, air and space, warfare has entered the fifth 
domain: cyberspace.”14 The chapter provides an overview of cyber security, the 
role of cyberspace in conflict, and how cyberspace is both a target and a tool of 
conflict. The chapter continues with a description of offensive and defensive 
technologies before it ends with a description and role of infrastructure. To show 
the severity of a planned cyber attack against a state, the chapter ends with a 
presentation of how Estonia was the victim of a major cyber attack in 2007.  
There are several definitions of cyberspace, but I have chosen to apply 
Daniel T. Kuehl’s definition: 
[A] global domain within the information environment whose 
distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics 
and the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, 
exchange, and exploit information via interdependent and 
interconnected networks using information-communication 
technologies.15 
Cyberspace also includes telecommunications, radio waves and other 
types of networks that process information. We are all part of this network, either 
as individuals or as employees. Computers, digital technology and cyberspace 
are all established terminology, and this thesis has as a premise that the reader 
has the basic knowledge of computers and networks. Regardless of location or 
reason for use, ever since the Internet and PCs came into common use, 
individuals have had to deal with one prominent challenge: hostile actors and 
cyber security.  
                                            
14 The Economist, “War in the fifth domain: Are the mouse and keyboard the new weapons 
of conflict?,” The Economist, July 1, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16478792. 
15 Daniel T. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower,” Ch 2 in Cyberpower and National 
Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 2009), 28. 
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B. CYBER SECURITY AND THREAT SOURCES 
Actors who consciously decide to conduct cyber attacks can potentially 
cause problems for any client who directly or indirectly is connected to the 
Internet. In addition to deliberately implemented and planned attacks, cyber 
systems may be vulnerable to accidents and natural disasters, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Threats and dangers.16 
Accidents and unintentional events are a major source of problems; an 
incident may be power outage, lack of cooling or inadequate maintenance of the 
networks. While these types of events may have serious consequences, they are 
not discussed in this thesis; the focus is on desired and planned attacks.  
An important factor is the number of potential attackers; in practice, 
anyone with an IP address is a potential attacker or target. This means that any 
person with harmful intent can carry out an attack against anybody with Internet 
access. The consequence is that the likelihood of being a target of an attack is 
very high, and it applies to both individuals and organizations. Technological 
development, distribution, and dependence on cyberspace form the backdrop for 
why this domain has developed multiple sources of threats.  
                                            
16 John Thuv, Ron Windvik, Kjell Olav Nystuen and Tormod Sivertsen, “Vulnerabilities in 
Internet,,” 21, has given me ideas to the figure, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2007/00903.pdf. 
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Groups or individuals may intentionally deploy cyber exploits targeting a 
specific cyber asset or attack through the Internet using a virus, worm, or 
malware with no specific target. Different types of cyber threats can use various 
cyber exploits that may adversely affect computers, software, or a network.17 The 
U.S. Accountability Office provides the following definitions: 
1. Botnet Operators 
Botnet operators use a network, or botnet, of compromised, remotely 
controlled systems to coordinate attacks and to distribute phishing schemes, 
spam, and malware attacks. The services of these networks are sometimes 
made available on underground markets (e.g., purchasing a denial of service 
attack or servers to relay spam or phishing attacks).18 
2. Criminal Groups 
Criminal groups seek to attack systems for financial gain. Specifically, 
organized criminal groups use spam, phishing, and spyware/malware to commit 
identity theft and online fraud. International corporate spies and criminal 
organizations also pose a threat through their ability to conduct industrial 
espionage and large-scale economic theft and by hiring or developing hacker 
talent.19 
3. Hackers 
Hackers break into networks for the thrill of the challenge, bragging rights 
in the hacker community, protest, revenge, stalking others, and monetary gain, 
as well as other reasons. Hackers can download attack scripts and protocols 
from the Internet and launch attacks against victim sites. Attack tools have 
become more sophisticated over time; in addition, they have become easier to 
                                            
17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Cyberspace: United States Faces Challenges in 
Addressing Global Cybersecurity and Governance” (Washington, D.C., 2010), 4–5, 
http://gao.gov/assets/310/308401.pdf. 
18 Ibid., 4. 
19 Ibid. 
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use. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the large majority of 
hackers do not have the requisite expertise to threaten complicated targets, such 
as critical U.S. networks. Nevertheless, the worldwide population of hackers 
poses a relatively high threat of an isolated or brief disruption causing serious 
damage.20 
4. Insiders 
The disgruntled insider of an organization is a principal source of 
computer crime. Insiders may not need a great deal of knowledge about 
computer intrusions because their knowledge of the target system often allows 
them to gain unrestricted access, thereby causing damage to the system or 
stealing system data. The insider threat includes contractors hired by the 
organization, as well as employees who accidentally introduce malware into 
systems.21 
5. Nations 
Nations use cyber tools as part of their information-gathering and 
espionage activities. In addition, several nations are aggressively working to 
develop IW doctrine, programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable a 
single entity to have a significant and serious impact by disrupting the supply, 
communications, and economic infrastructures, thereby affecting the daily lives of 
citizens across the country.22 
Each actor has different motivations, abilities and finances to pose a 
threat. Common to all is their potential to be dangerous. An insider with a USB 
stick can cause just as much damage as a nation that has vast resources at its 
disposal. The potential of damage and conflict is considerable; small resources 
that are inserted in the right place can have major consequences. Cyberspace is 





therefore an arena where those who want to produce effects have great 
opportunities, both positive and negative.  
C. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF CYBERSPACE IN CONFLICT? 
Cyber technology is greatly altering the nature of warfare as we enter the 
twenty-first century. Thinking of cyberspace as an arena of conflict goes as far 
back as 1976 when Thomas P. Rona published the paper, “Weapon Systems 
and Information War.”23 Some analysts claim that this early work was only 
focused on information flow in military operations, but it helped to define 
cyberspace at an early stage.  
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt published “Cyber War is Coming!” in 
1993, in which they advocated that warfare was no longer reserved for those who 
used the most capital, labor and technology on the battlefield, but also those who 
had the best information.24  
From 1988 until the present, the tremendous development of the Internet 
has also resulted in a growth in cyber attacks and cyber crime. Some consider 
the cyber attacks on Estonia that started April 27, 2007 to be the first major cyber 
attack on a nation state. Even though Morris’s worm in 1988 took systems down 
for days, it posed no great threat or damage; however, the attack on Estonia was 
of a completely different magnitude.  
Cyber incidents in recent years have aroused great concern among 
governments in many countries, including Norway. The potential threat is 
substantial. The greatest concern, however, is that which has not yet happened. 
Because cyberspace is a relatively new phenomenon, nobody can accurately 
predict the potential threats and vulnerabilities. 
                                            
23  Thomas P. Rona, “Weapon Systems and Information War” (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, July 1, 1976).  
24 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” (RAND Corporation 1993). 
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Cyberspace can have multiple roles and may be used as a tool for military 
operations. Gregory Rattray and Jason Healey explain a few key aspects 
relevant to the role of cyberspace as a war fighting domain:25 
First, logical but physical: Though a war fighting domain, 
cyberspace has some striking differences from the other domains. 
“Unlike the land, sea, air and space where the laws of physics do 
not change, cyberspace is a man-made creation that continually 
changes and evolves.”26  
Second, usually used, owned, and controlled predominantly by the private 
sector: Future conflicts in cyberspace are very likely to be won or lost in 
the private sector, which runs, owns, and depends on the underlying 
networks and information, at least in the most advanced economies.27 
Third, tactically fast but operationally slow: Cyberspace, where the 
computer is the battlefield, is widely considered to be an operational 
environment through which an attacker can strike with minimal investment 
while yielding potentially large-scale effects with great speed.28 
Fourth, fraught with uncertainty: Cyberspace is an extremely complex 
environment, characterized by rapid change and adaption, whose 
direction is difficult to predict.29 
A common denominator is that cyberspace cuts across boundaries 
between the civil and the military and between the public and the private. Anyone 
who has the will to use cyberspace can affect the government, the military, 
businesses or private persons. An attack may have a number of secondary 
consequences on other peripherally involved actors. This means that cyber 
attacks can have accidental and unpredictable consequences.  
                                            
25 Gregory Rattray and Jason Healey, “Categorizing and Understanding Offensive Cyber 
Capabilities and Their Use,” in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyber Attacks: Informing 
Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, National Research Council, (The National 
academics Press 2010), 77. 
26 Ibid., 78. 




D. OFFENSIVE CYBER TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS 
In digital space, some claim that the attackers always have an advantage. 
They only need to find one hole to penetrate a system, while those who defend 
the system must locate and seal all holes.30 Both offensive and defensive 
technologies have their own characteristics and methods. This section gives an 
overview of technologies and methods for cyber offensive operations, including 
network intrusions, malware, botnets, and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. It also 
gives an overview of technologies and methods of defense, including 
cryptography, access controls, and intrusion/malware detection/prevention. 
1. Systems Penetration   
Systems penetration could be an attack on servers, routers, PCs, smart 
phones or any device with processor and memory. Attackers can gain entry 
through  a variety of means, such as logging into a user or system account with a 
password or PIN. The attacker might exploit a vulnerability in software (e.g., web 
services) or find backdoors into the system. The attacker might join the target’s 
wireless network where it may be possible to read traffic, alter it, and get access 
to other devices on the network.  
2. Phishing Attacks 
Another trend in attacks involves “phishing” email: the aim is revealing 
sensitive information or getting malicious software installed, by an attacker 
pretending to be a trusted organization or individual. When the unsuspecting user 
enters account information, the attacker harvests this data, using it for identity 
theft. Recent phishing attacks include so-called spear phishing attacks that target 
a particular organization or even individuals. Such phishing email may appear to 
come from a trusted individual, such as a government, corporate executive or 
                                            
30 Norwegian Intelligence Service, Focus 2012, 26, http://forsvaret.no/om-
forsvaret/organisasjon/felles/etjenesten/Documents/etj_lo-res.pdf. 
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manager and exhorts the recipient to take some action. By clicking on a link in a 
spear-phishing email could allow the attacker to exploit the victim’s browser.31  
3. Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks 
A Denial-of-Service attack aims to disrupt the normal operation of a 
computer system (e.g., web server or email server). A common method used in 
DoS attacks is to deluge a system or site with messages that drastically slow 
down its response time or to overwhelm its data handling capacity, resulting in a 
system crash. In many countries a DoS attack is a criminal offense even if 
intended as a prank.32 
In a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack a network of computers 
sends attack packets all at once. This kind of attack typically generates more 
traffic than do single-source DoS attacks and often renders the target system 
unavailable to its intended users.  
4. Malware (Malicious Software) 
Malware refers to software programs designed to damage or do other 
unwanted actions on a computer system. Common examples of malware include 
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Viruses, for example, can wreak 
havoc on a computer’s hard drive by deleting files or directory information. 
Unknown to the user, spyware can gather data such as web pages visited or 
credit card information from a user’s system.33 Remote access Trojans can give 
the attacker full control over a compromised machine.  
                                            
31 Edvard Skoudis, “Evolutionary Trends in Cyberspace,” Ch 6 in Cyberpower and National 
Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 2009), 165. 
32 Business Dictionary, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/denial-of-service-DOS-
attack.html. 
33 Techterms definitions, http://www.techterms.com/definition/malware. 
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Malware may be propagated in many ways, including emails with 
attachments and websites. Malware is often installed in stages until the 
adversary has full control of the target system.34 
5. Botnets 
An attack technology of particular power and significance is the botnet. 
Botnets are networks of compromised computers that are remotely controlled by 
the attacker. On a compromised computer, an individual bot is connected to the 
Internet and runs software clandestinely introduced by the attacker. The attack 
value of a botnet arises from the sheer number of computers that an attacker can 
control, often tens or hundreds of thousands and perhaps as many as a million. 
Since all of these computers are under one attacker’s control, the botnet can act 
as a powerful amplifier. Botnets are ideally suited for conducting Distributed 
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks against computer systems.35 
E. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS  
With so many methods of conducting cyber attacks, a huge market for 
technology that protects the network from unauthorized access has grown. Anti-
virus programs for personal computers are prevalent; however, defense 
technology must be more than just anti-virus.   
1. Cryptography  
Cryptography is the science of principles and techniques to hide 
information so that only the authorized agent has the opportunity to reveal the 
contents. The wide spread development of computer communications has led to 
that new forms of cryptography are developed. In data and telecommunications, 
cryptography is necessary for communication over any untrusted medium, which 
includes just about any network, particularly the Internet. Within the context of 
                                            
34 William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin (eds.), Technology, Policy, Law, 
and Ethics Regarding US Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities, National Research 
Council, (The National Academies Press, 2009), 97–98. 
35 Ibid., 92. 
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any application-to-application communication, some specific security 
requirements include: Authentication: 1) Proof of a person’s identity and the 
source of a message, 2) Privacy/confidentiality: Contributes to that it’s only 
recipient of a message can read it, 3) Integrity: Retains the original message 
content, and 4) Non-repudiation: Prove that the sender is the one who sent the 
message.36 
Cryptography supports all of these functions. It not only protects data from 
theft or alteration, but it also provides user and source authentication and non-
repudiation.  
Three types of cryptographic schemes are used to accomplish these 
goals: secret key (or symmetric) cryptography, public-key (or asymmetric) 
cryptography, and hash functions.37 
2. Identification and Authentication 
Identification is the process whereby a network element recognizes a valid 
actor’s identity. Authentication is the process of verifying the claimed identity of 
an actor who may be a person, a process, or a system (e.g., another network 
element) that access a network element to perform tasks or process a call. 
Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user can be based on a 
password, Personal Identification Number (PIN), smart card, biometric, token, 
exchange of keys, or other similar devices.38 
3. Intrusion and Malware Detection and Blockage  
An intrusion detection system (IDS) inspects inbound and outbound 
network activity and Identifies suspicious patterns that may indicate a network or 
                                            
36 An overview of Cryptography, Ch 2, 
http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html#purpose. 
37 Ibid., Ch 2. 
38 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Security Division, “Identification 
and Authentication of Users,” http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800–11/node26.html. 
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system attack.39 Malware detection screens incoming data (files, web pages, 
etc.) for malware, Trojan horses and phishing attempts. Both block packets and 
data that match the signatures of known threats.40 
Both offensive and defensive technologies are under constant 
development and exist in a competitive relationship. The following section 
discusses a series of spectacular attacks against critical infrastructure and the 
resulting effects. 
F. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, VULNERABILITIES AND ATTACKS 
Critical infrastructure (CI), which comprises systems that are essential to 
maintain society’s critical functions, is the backbone of a nation’s economy, 
security and health. Examples are roads, water, and power. In case of failure in 
these systems, the society is not able to maintain the supply of goods and 
services upon which the population is dependent. The critical infrastructure 
supports national security and the country’s vital national interests.41  
Serious failures in critical systems could rapidly lead to massive disruption 
in society. To a greater or lesser extent, the different systems are 
interdependent, and the effects of failure in one of them can have cascading 
effects on others. 
Critical infrastructure (CI) is familiar to most people as the power used in 
our homes, heating, water, roads, bridges, the means of communication both the 
physical as well as telephones, radios, networks, computers and TV. These 
systems are all networks of computers and other devices being monitored or 
                                            
39 Webopedia, is a free online dictionary for words phrases and abbreviations that are 
related to computer and Internet technology, 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/intrusion_detection_system.html. 
40 Cisco, Security Flirting, Definitions, https://docs.meraki.com/display/MX/Security+filtering. 
41 Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU), [Norwegian Official Reports] 2006:6, Når 
sikkerheten er viktigst: Beskyttelse av landets kritiske infrastrukturer og kritiske 
samfunnsfunksjoner, 5 japril 2006 [When security is important: Protecting the nation’s critical 
infrastructures and critical societal functions, April 5, 2006, 11, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/nouer/2006/nou-2006–6/5/1.html?id=157439.  
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controlled by them. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, 
which provide centralized control over the other components, perform key 
functions for many critical services, including power generation and distribution, 
oil and gas distribution, and water treatment and distribution. CI are the heart and 
brain of systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital that their 
incapacitation or destruction would have a devastating effect on national security, 
economic security and national public safety.42 Historically, with their reliance on 
proprietary networks and hardware, SCADA systems were considered safe from 
cyber attacks and were not designed for security. The situation has changed, but 
security is still inadequate in many of these systems, making them vulnerable to 
disruption of service or manipulation of operational data that could result in public 
safety concerns.43 In 2013 Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet found over 2,500 
SCADA systems in Norway used for example in defense, health, oil industry and 
the public transportation. Some were protected by a username and password, 
others were as open as any website.44 Cyber attacks on SCADA systems, 
especially in energy production and distribution systems, could endanger public 
health and safety as well as invoke serious environmental damage 
G. ATTACKS–A HISTORICAL REVIEW 
Infrastructure attack is a story as old as war. Since time immemorial 
attackers have sought to cut off their target’s water supply and transportation, 
often with decisive results. Starting in the nineteenth century, the rise of modern 
infrastructure systems brought heightened concerns about vulnerability.45 
                                            
42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Infrastructure protection Plan,” 7,  
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp_consolidated_snapshot.pdf.  
43 Arne Roar Nygård, “Risk management in SCADA system,,” Master’s Thesis, Royal 
Institute of Technology, Sweden, July 2004, p iii, http://brage.bibsys.no/hig/handle/URN:NBN:no-
bibsys_brage_4310.  
44 Linn Kongsli Hillestad, Espen Sandli and Ola Strømman, “In the worst case, people can 
die,” Dagbladet, October 17, 2013, 
http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/10/17/nyheter/innenriks/datasikkerhet/nullctrl/28572676/.  
45 William D. O’Neil, “Cyberspace and Infrastructure” Ch 5 in Cyberpower and National 
Security, ed. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz (Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 2009), 113. 
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Attacks against single critical targets became a reality after 1982 and showed 
that these were vulnerable to cyber attacks. Even greater attention was given to 
the cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008; the last section 
describes the events in Estonia.   
1. Attacks on Infrastructure   
In “A Survey of SCADA and Critical Infrastructure Incidents,” Bill Miller and 
Dale C. Rowe have listed examples of attacks targeting critical infrastructure and 
the effects they have had. A selection of these attacks is provided in the following 
subsection.46  
a. Siberian Pipeline Explosion (1982) 
In 1982, intruders planted a Trojan horse in the SCADA system that 
controls the Siberian Pipeline. This is the first known cyber-security incident 
involving critical infrastructure and caused an explosion equivalent to three 
kilotons of TNT.47 
b. Chevron Emergency Alert System (1992)  
In 1992 a fired Chevron employee hacked into the company’s 
emergency alert network and reconfiguring them so they would crash. It was first 
discovered when an emergency arose at the Chevron refinery in Richmond, 
California. During the ten-hour period in 1992 when the system was down, 
thousands of people in twenty-two states and six unspecified areas of Canada 
were put at risk.48  
                                            
46 Bill Miller and Dale C. Rowe, “A Survey of SCADA and Critical Infrastructure 
Incidents,”Brigham Young University Information Technology Program Provo, Utah, 2, 
http://sigite2012.sigite.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/session17-paper01.pdf. 
47 Ibid., 2. 
48 Ibid. 
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c. Gazprom (1999) 
“In 1999, hackers broke into Gazprom, a gas company in Russia. 
The attack was collaborated with a Gazprom insider. The hackers were said to 
have used a Trojan horse to gain control of the central switchboard that controls 
gas flow in pipelines.”49 
d. Bellingham (1999) 
In June 1999, after database development work on the SCADA 
system, 237,000 gallons of gasoline was leaked into a creek that flowed through 
Whatcom Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. The accident caused three 
deaths and eight documented injuries. “While the incident was an accident rather 
than an attack, the loss of human life illustrates the dangers of any kind of failure 
in a critical infrastructure system.”50 
e. Stuxnet (2010) 
In June 2010, a worm named Stuxnet attacked the Iranian nuclear 
facility at Natanz. Stuxnet who used four ‘zero-day vulnerabilities’ and attacked 
drives were used to power centrifuges used in the concentration of the uranium-
235 isotope. The worm accessed and altered Windows operating systems and 
frequency-converter drives. Stuxnet caused the centrifuges to switch between 
high and low speeds, making them useless.51 
f. Night Dragon (2011) 
In February 2011, ‘Night Dragon’ a combination of social 
engineering, Trojan horses and Windows-based exploits where used to attack 
five global energy and oil firms. The attacks were confirmed to have been 
                                            
49 Ibid., 2. 
50 ibid., 3. 
51 Ibid. 
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ongoing for over two years using Chinese tools and compromised Chinese 
computers, maybe in order to mask their identity.52 
g. Shamoon (2012) 
In August 2012, Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco and Qatar’s RAS 
Gas, reported infection by a Trojan horse resulting in corruption of numerous 
workstations. Data was overwritten, lost and it was not possible to recover any 
data.  “Due to the highly destructive functionality of the Shamoon “Wiper” 
module, organizations infected with the malware could experience operational 
impacts including loss of intellectual property and disruption of critical systems.”53   
A recent report from the Department of Homeland Security 
revealed that cyber criminals have targeted the oil and gas sector more than any 
other industry in the United States. “Over the six months leading to May 2013 
there were 111 cyber incidents reported by the energy sector, accounting for 
53% of all reported cyber attacks to industrial control systems.”54 Developing 
technology has made great strides forward, while protective measures have not 
received the same attention.  
In the first half of fiscal year 2013, (October 1, 2012–May 2013), 
ICS-CERT responded to over 200 incidents across all critical infrastructure 
sectors.55 The effect of an attack would be even greater if it were directed 
against several basic services in a society. While the examples of attacks on oil 
and gas had a serious impact, the attacks against Estonia in 2008 gave a 
warning of what is possible. 
                                            
52 Ibid., 4. 
53 U.S. Department of Energy, Technical Lessons Learned from the Shamoon Malware 
Attacks, CIP Awareness Bulletin – Joint Product October 2012, “Shamoon Malware Targets Oil 




54 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “ICS-CERT Monitor,” 2, http://ics-cert.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/ICS-CERT_Monitor_April-June2013.pdf. 
55 Ibid., 2. 
 24 
2. Attacks on a Nation State ‒ Estonia 
Since 2001, Estonia has been one of the countries in Europe with the 
most developed digital network. All the inhabitants have a digital ID-card. Estonia 
was the first country in the world to introduce election over the Internet for the 
local elections in 2005.56  
On April 27, 2007, Estonian authorities decided to move the monument 
“Bronze Soldier” from the center of the capital Tallinn to a war cemetery on the 
outskirts of the city. The move was very unpopular with the Russian minority and 
with the Russian authorities. This resulted in extensive cyber attacks in the 
following months.57 
The first cyber attacks were against Estonia’s government and private 
Internet Service Providers (ISP). These attacks included Distributed Denial-of -
Service (DDoS) attacks. The main targets were the websites of the Parliament, 
the President and the Prime Minister. Several news stations were also attacked. 
The first attacks were simple in their form, uncoordinated and easily averted.58 
The next attack consisted of millions of emails sent to Estonia’s members of 
Parliament with the text “Congratulations on the Victory Day” and caused large 
numbers of errors and problems with mail servers. The result was that the 
government and other government institutions were without communication 
capabilities for several days. Some leading newspapers’ websites were also 
attacked and closed from the outside. The attacks were more sophisticated than 
normal DDoS attacks; they were better coordinated and much more extensive.  
The third attack targeted the President, Prime Minister, banks, political 
parties, major news agency, government, private Internet Service Providers and 
                                            
56 eEstonia, The Digital Society, http://e-estonia.com/components/x-road. 
57 Heather A. Conley and Theodore P. Gerber, “Soft Power in the 21st Century, an 
examination of Russian compatriot policy in Estonia,” a report of the CSIS Europe program, 
August 2011, 1–7, http://csis.org/files/publication/110826_Conley_RussianSoftPower_Web.pdf. 
58 Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, International Cyber Incidents, Tallinn, 
Estland 2010, 18, http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf. 
 25 
telephone companies vulnerable to DDoS attacks.59 Sites and services were 
heavily affected with economic losses. Estonia was said to be very close to a 
digital collapse on May 10, 2007.60 
The last major attack was a massive DDoS attack carried out by a bot 
network with 85,000 “zombie computers” against the Computer Emergency 
Response Team Estonia.61  
It seems clear that most of the cyber attacks originated from Russian 
nationalist hacker groups.62 Russian authorities had called for sanctions against 
Estonia and did little to stop riots outside the Estonian embassy. Russian 
authorities did not help the Estonian government in finding the responsible 
hackers and alleged perpetrators of the cyber attack. The fact that these attacks 
were well received in the Kremlin, however, does not mean that the government 
was behind them. The lack of follow-up afterwards speaks a clearer language, 
but proves little.  
H. SUMMARY 
Technological development, distribution and dependence of cyberspace 
allows almost anyone with an IP address to be a potential attacker or target, this 
means that the chance of being a target of an attack from botnet operators, 
criminal groups, hackers or nations is very high.  
In conflict, the role of cyberspace is in constant change, more and more 
available technology challenges any cyber defense. Several nations are 
aggressively working to develop IW doctrine, programs, and capabilities in 
cyberspace since opportunities to inflict damage are significant for an attacker. 
Many actors have greater opportunity than ever before to direct cyber attacks 
                                            
59 Ibid., 21. 
60 Scott Shackelford, “From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in 
International Law,” Berkeley Journal of International Law nr. 27:1 2008, 205. 
61 Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, International Cyber Incidents, 20.  
62 David J. Smith, “How Russia Harnesses Cyberwarfare,” 8–9, Defense Dossier, Issue 4, 
August 2012, http://www.afpc.org/files/august2012.pdf. 
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against critical infrastructure, while cyberspace cuts across boundaries between 
the civil and the military and between the public and the private.  
Modern society is connected to many networks and some are particularly 
vulnerable to attacks. SCADA systems are an example of such especially 
vulnerable systems. Infrastructure attacks, either on specific individual targets or 
on larger targets as in the Estonian case, serve as a reminder of how advanced 
attacks might be. Just as important, however, is the recognition of the difficulty in 
tracking and revealing an attacker.  
The most important recognition of cyberspace is the size, complexity and 
speed. This means that techniques, tactics and strategies in cyberspace will 
evolve, as we have seen it in the other domains: land, sea, air and space, but 
with a different speed. In cyberspace change will probably go even faster than in 
any other domain, and those who have developed holistic concepts are likely to 
dominate others. After the Second World War, the world was divided between 
the superpowers; it would not be inconceivable that it will be divided between 
those who have cyber power in the future. 
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III. CYBER POWER–THREATS OF STATES 
A. BACKGROUND 
Opinions differ over the definition of cyber power. In simple terms, it can 
be said as follows: “Cyber power is the capability to apply or project force in or 
through the cyber domain, a tool for both attack and defense.”63 This chapter 
aims to provide an understanding of what cyber power is. It provides a definition 
of cyber power, the role of cyber power in conflict, and how different scholars 
assess cyber power. A discussion of how deterrence might be conducted in 
cyberspace and how cyber deterrence can be an opportunity for Norway follows. 
The chapter concludes with an overview of how cyber operations can support 
other types of military operations. 
B. WHAT IS CYBER POWER?  
Daniel T. Kuehl defines cyberspace as “an operational space where 
humans and our organizations use the necessary technologies to act and create 
effects...In this sense it is no different from any of the other four physical 
domains—air, land, sea and outer space—in which we operate...”64  
Kuehl claims that “the analogy among the domains of air-land-sea and 
outer space and cyberspace, and those same analogies hold true for a concept 
of cyber power as drawn from sea power or airpower.”65 According to Kuehl, this 
leads to the definition of cyber power as “the ability to use cyberspace to create 
advantages and influence events in all the operational environments and across 
the instruments of power.”66 Kuehl claims that cyber power is shaped by multiple 
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factors: first, technology, because the ability to “enter” cyberspace is what makes 
it possible to use it; and second, organizational mission, be it military, economic, 
or political.67 Kuehl concludes, “All of these different factors shape how we 
employ cyber power to impact and influence the elements of power. Cyber power 
creates synergies across the other elements and instruments of power and 
connects them in ways that improve all of them.”68  
Another scholar who has defined cyber power is Joseph Nye, Jr. He 
argues that “cyber power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use 
of the electronically interconnected information resources of the cyber domain.”69  
Nye argues that there are two types of power shifts in this century. 
Historically the power has transitioned from one dominant state to another, but 
more recently the information revolution has changed the nature of power and 
increased its diffusion. With this he means that although the state will remain the 
dominant actor, it will face increased competition from non-state actors, which 
will make it more difficult for the state to control society.70 The traditional 
concepts of international security and international relations may, therefore, 
change and new concepts must be developed. Nye also states that “cyber power 
can be used to produce preferred outcomes within cyberspace, or it can use 
cyber instruments to produce preferred outcomes in other domains outside 
cyberspace.”71  
From Joseph Nye’s point of view, a concept of complex interdependence 
describes the world politics. From his perspective, cyberspace is not a neutral 
environment where everybody can act as if belonging to the same family. This 
idea leads to the perception that cyberspace is divided between the strong and 
the weak, the rich and the poor, the digital and the analog. With regard to 
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security, this means that non-neutral cyberspace needs different kind of security 
both in a technological and in a social sense.72 
Both Kuehl and Nye’s definitions contain “the influence of others” with 
slightly different words. The possibility that cyber power creates cross-border 
synergies and improves other instruments of power makes it into a unique force 
multiplier, of interest for Norway. This means that a nation’s ability to have 
success in, for example, conventional war, could increase if the nation has a 
well-developed cyber capability. Such a scenario opens up many considerations 
regarding the acquisition of cyber capabilities. While Kuehl and Nye both suggest 
that we need to think of cyber power in a new way where non-state actors play a 
bigger role, other scholars have a different view.  
C. CYBER WAR–DIFFERENT VIEWS   
Two other academic schools of thought regarding cyber power exist as 
suggested by Hans-Inge Langø in the paper, “Slaying Cyber Dragons: 
Competing Academic Approaches to Cyber Security.”73 These are the 
revolutionists and traditionalists: 
1. The Revolutionists 
The first school of thought that Langø describes is the revolutionists.74 
Their thoughts about cyber power are, according to him, the oldest and go as far 
back as 1976 when Thomas P. Rona published the paper “Weapon Systems and 
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Information War.”75 Although Rona focuses on military operations, Langø claims 
that this early work in the field helped to define cyber power and that some of the 
ideas presented are still relevant today.  
These early thoughts on cyber power and cyber warfare were developed 
over time as technology became more accessible to the general public. John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt published “Cyber War Is Coming!” in 1993; in this 
work they asserted that wars would no longer be determined by who used the 
most capital, labor and technology on the battlefield, but who had the best 
information of the battlefield.76 
The main claim by scholars with a revolutionist view is that they believe 
that new technology will change the very nature of warfare. Richard A. Clarke 
and Robert K. Knake in Cyber War make the same type of arguments regarding 
cyber war:77 Cyber war is real, global and capable of occurring at the speed of 
light. 
In response to these alarmist messages other academics are inherently 
skeptical of the potential of cyber power. Langø defines them as the 
traditionalists. 
2. The Traditionalists 
Langø underscores that the traditionalist thinkers do not reject that the 
technology has had an impact, but they are reluctant to throw away existing 
concepts, doctrines and policies prematurely.78 One of the scholars that Langø 
defines as a traditionalist is Martin C. Libicki. In his early work, Libicki argues that 
the theoretical potential for cyber warfare exists, but it is unlikely at the present 
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time and in the immediate future.79 Libicki’s main argument is that the technology 
does not allow it, and there is a lack of empirical data that supports such warfare. 
Many revolutionists argue that the entry cost of conducting cyber warfare 
is low compared to the other domains of warfare. A traditionalist response to this 
claim can be found in Dorothy E. Denning’s work. She argues that while the cost 
of conducting cyber attacks, such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks 
and webpage defacements, is low; the effects of these types of attacks are not 
equivalent to those of large-scale, costly military operations: 
The effects of cyber-attacks are relatively minor compared to what 
is achieved with armed forces, especially military operations that 
lead to the overthrow of governments, seizure of land, and human 
casualties. The discrepancy may narrow with more sophisticated 
cyber attacks that affect physical systems, but such attacks are 
likely to also have higher costs, raising the barriers to entry.80 
Traditionalists acknowledge that technology has had a huge impact on 
society but that traditional instruments of national security are no less important. 
Instead of looking at cyberspace as a new way of warfare, they think it should be 
seen as a new tool in the state’s toolbox for warfare.81 
3. Assessments 
Regardless of which school of thought they represent, the scholars have 
brought a great deal of clarity to the debate about cyber power. In short, 
revolutionists have shown the potential of cyber power; traditionalists have 
shown its limitations. Norway should recognize the potential of cyber power and 
that an effective national defense requires a combination of defensive and 
offensive capabilities. 
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D. WHY KEEP CYBER CAPACITY? 
Danish scientist Magnus Hjortedal argues that there are three reasons for 
states to maintain and utilize an aggressive cyber capability: 
To deter other states by infiltrating their critical infrastructure; 
To gain increased knowledge through espionage in cyberspace, 
which makes it possible for states to advance more quickly in their 
military development; 
To make economic gains where technological progress has been 
achieved—for example, through industrial espionage. This can be 
accomplished outside of official institutions.82 
Hjortdal presents two primary effects of a nation’s well-developed cyber 
capabilities: ability to deter and ability to conduct espionage. The capacity to 
carry out espionage for a variety of reasons and on different targets is an 
important manifestation of cyber power, which will be discussed in Chapter IV.   
The following sections explain how cyber deterrence can be an effective 
tool that is not reserved for large nations.  
1. Deterrence in Cyberspace 
Denying benefits, imposing costs, and encouraging restraints to a 
potential attacker is the aim of deterrence. The U.S. Strategic Command defines 
deterrence as follows: 
“Deterrence seeks to convince adversaries not to take actions that 
threaten U.S. vital interests by means of decisive influence over 
their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly 
threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while 
encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will 
result in an acceptable outcome.”83 
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Adapted to cyberspace, deterrence seeks to prevent the potential threat of 
cyber attacks from states or groups by making the attacker realize that there is 
no chance of success or that the attacked nation has the ability to respond in a 
way that will be costly for the attacker. The assumption is that a state has the 
capability to threaten an opponent. One could deter a cyber attack by threatening 
some other action against the attacker. For non-state actors, the threat could be 
prison. For a state, it might be sanctions or a conventional military strike. 
In analyzing deterrence of cyber attacks, Richard L. Kugler claims, “the 
goal of a cyber deterrence strategy would be to influence an adversary’s 
decision-making calculus so decisively that it will not launch cyber attacks.”84 W. 
Earl Boebert mentions two factors that act to deter large scale disruptive cyber 
attacks from any source: “The first of these is the risk of an unintended 
consequence that the initiator, or allies of the initiator, are harmed by the attack.” 
The second factor is: “a disruptive cyber attack is very unlikely to resemble a 
kinetic attack like a truck bomb.”85 
Boebert acknowledges uncertainty and the possibility that deterrence will 
not work unless it can be followed by kinetic methods. On the other hand, nations 
without military means may use the UN or international agreements to put 
pressure on an attacker. Diplomacy, bilateral agreements or membership in a 
union have an increasingly important role as an alternative or substitute for 
military power.  
The development of the EU is one such example where military force has 
little or no role in relationships among nations. Conversely, economic 
agreements are very important and any threat of economic sanctions can have a 
huge impact. Another possibility is that the UN Security Council could take 
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measures against an aggressive state under Article 39, assuming the aggressive 
action crossed the threshold for a response. A nation’s cyber deterrence strategy 
may rest on such sanctions. This might be just as effective as threats of a military 
response. Another way might be to consistently pursue all cyber attackers and 
take them to court. For a country like Norway, both options should be considered. 
Norway is already a member of multiple international forums; Norway provides 
substantial sums to both EU countries and other nations. These are key areas 
that can back up future cyber deterrence. Prosecuting cyber attacks from non-
state actors is probably an action the Norwegian government can take. A 
prerequisite is cooperation with other governments so that they can investigate, 
identify and arrest the attackers. In this way, the work of different scholars can be 
operationalized and may be developed to fit a small nation’s cyber strategy.  
E. CYBER ATTACK IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Cyber attacks can support a variety of operations within the information 
operations sphere and also other military operations. In addition, cyber attacks 
can also be applied to missions that are not traditionally within the military 
domain. 
1. Active Defense in Response to Adversary Probes/Attacks 
Cyber attacks could be used defensively to eliminate a threat to 
government systems or networks. Active cyber defense (ACD) is a term that 
describes a wide range of proactive actions that engage the adversary before 
and during a cyber incident.   ACD can dramatically improve efforts to prevent, 
detect and respond to sophisticated attacks.86 
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2. Support for Information Operations 
a. Psychological Operations  
Key enemy personnel can be targeted in a cyber campaign by 
emails or telephone calls asking them to surrender or to escape. Another 
PSYOPS application might call for the launch of a small, but very visible cyber 
attack and then the announcement of the attack to an adversary in order to 
undermine confidence in their essential systems.87  
b. Operations Security 
Cyber attacks directed at systems for command and control, 
including specific adversary sensor systems that are intended to report on 
information related to the location of friendly forces will degrade operations 
security.88  
c. Military Deception 
Cyber attacks could be used to gain access to an adversary 
computer systems for identification, by assuming control of a computer used by a 
senior intelligence analyst, bogus email traffic or communications could be sent 
to that analyst’s customers.89 In this way, the enemy is given a wrong image of 
military build-up or maneuver. 
d. Electronic Warfare (EW) 
Cyber attacks could be used to disable an adversary’s software-
defined radios, thus preventing enemy wireless battlefield communications. In 
addition, EW could support cyber attacks.90 
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e. Support of Traditional Military Operations 
Cyber attacks could also be used in connection with a variety of 
traditional military operations. Some examples are:   
• Disruption of adversary command, control, and 
communications  
• Suppression of adversary air defenses  
• Degradation of adversary smart munitions and platforms  
• Attacking adversary war fighting- or war making 
infrastructure91 
f. Support to Nonmilitary Operations 
Cyber attacks can support a variety of other operations as well, 
though these are not in the category of what are traditionally undertaken by 
military forces.92 This may be cyber attack against the economic base of 
organized crime or some intelligence operations. 
g. Covert Operations 
Classic examples of covert action include providing weapons or 
funding to a favored party in a conflict, supporting agents to influence political 
affairs in another nation, engaging in psychological warfare, disseminating 
disinformation about a disfavored party, or deceiving a disfavored party. Specific 
actions that could be undertaken under the rubric of covert action include: 
Intelligence collection and disseminating of propaganda in order to create 
tensions between adversaries or groups. Other possibilities are to attack the 
economic system, creating fear in the population or disrupt vital infrastructure.93  
These examples show how operations in cyberspace can support 
virtually any conceivable military operation. It is a reminder to the nations that 
have built a defensive doctrine; it will require significant resources to protect 
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against all these threats. It is also an important reminder that cyber power is 
created when a nation has some offensive capabilities and is willing to use it.  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter started by asking whether cyberspace has opened up a new 
channel in which states can project power. The discussion has shown that there 
are many opinions about cyber power and what it represents. Kuehl and Nye 
offer views of cyber power that could provide a basis for a strategy that may be 
suitable for Norway’s cyber defense. The premise is that one accepts the role of 
how power is distributed in cyberspace, and that there is no distinction between 
war and peace in cyberspace since states and individuals are constantly 
pursuing their own interests. Faced with this reality, Norway should, on the one 
hand, seek cooperation and, on the other hand, realize that offensive cyber 
capabilities are a complement to defensive capabilities.  
The next key question was whether cyber power could deter another 
state. This research indicates that cyber power definitely has the power to hurt 
another state; however, cyber power has its clear limits in comparison to military 
power, and any cyber deterrence must be supported by diplomatic means. Based 
on that assumption, cyber deterrence cannot have a “stand-alone” strategic 
effect, but it will work best as an amplifier.  
Cyber operations can support military operations in a variety of ways. For 
small countries, it is possible that the perception around warfare means that, by 
default, resources must concentrate on defense. This may explain why many 
nations seem to lack strategies for offensive operations in cyberspace. Others, 
however, have manifested a reputation as notorious cyber warriors. China is 
emerging as a nation with a very well-developed cyber capability, both 
defensively and offensively. China is thus helping to set the standard for future 
cyber powers. 
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IV. CHINA’S CAPABILITIES IN CYBERSPACE 
A. BACKGROUND 
The 2013 annual report to the U.S. Congress on Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China states: “The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive 
military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed 
forces to fight and win short- duration, high-intensity regional military conflict.”94  
This chapter describes how China has built up a significant capacity in 
cyberspace. It illustrates how a government can plan for cyber war, develop 
capabilities and use cyberspace as an arena of influence. China is an important 
example, because Chinese doctrine and technology will emerge as attractive for 
other nations with cyber ambitions. Insights into China’s capabilities in 
cyberspace can provide an indication of how other nations are likely to develop 
their own capacities. It should also be noted that the U.S. has a significant cyber 
capacity and U.S. Cyber Command is probably the largest of its kind. However, 
the focus here is on China, as its capabilities and intentions are more relevant to 
Norwegian challenges. 
Developing cyber capabilities for warfare is consistent with authoritative 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military writings. Cyber warfare capabilities could 
serve the PRC’s military operations in three key areas:  
First and foremost, they allow data collection through ex-filtration.  
Second, they can be employed to constrain an adversary’s actions 
or slow response time by targeting network-based logistics, 
communications, and commercial activities.  
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Third, they can serve as a force multiplier when coupled with 
military and security developments involving kinetic attacks by the 
People’s Republic of China during times of crisis or conflict.95 
In 2012, numerous computer systems around the world continued to be 
targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to the 
Chinese government and military. These intrusions were focused on exfiltrating 
information.96 A Chinese military hacker group connected to the government is 
believed to be behind cyber attacks against sensitive targets in Norway. The 
Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) said Norwegian companies have 
probably lost contracts because of computer espionage. According to NSM, at 
least 20 serious cyber attacks can be traced back to China.97 The relationship 
between Norway and China has been at a low point since the Nobel Peace Prize 
was awarded to a Chinese dissident in 2010.98  
B. THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY 
The PLA is the overall military organization of all land, sea and air forces 
of the People’s Republic of China. The Army was created on August 1, 1927 as 
the military part of the Chinese Communist Party. The PLA now consists of a 
multidimensional force structure capable of conducting military operations across 
a realm incorporating land, sea, air, space, and finally, cyberspace.99  
The PLA has several distinct entities that operate in the cyber domain, 
including elements of the headquarters staff and potentially each military branch, 
some combination of which would execute cyber attacks during wartime. Several 
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entities within China’s intelligence and security services also have a cyber 
espionage mandate. Nominally independent groups may engage in state-
sponsored exploitation, and certain corporate actors, such as Chinese 
information technology or telecommunications firms, may also operate in 
cyberspace on the state’s behalf.100 The following sections, describe the PLA 
and China’s cyber capabilities. 
1. China’s Cyber Strategy 
The PLA is investing heavily in the development of IW capabilities, 
especially in the areas of electronics and cyber warfare. It has established IW 
units and is also able to harness extensive civilian resources to conduct cyber- 
warfare operations, even during peacetime.101 
PLA campaign doctrine identifies the necessity of early establishment of 
information dominance over an enemy as one of the highest operational priorities 
in a conflict.102 For this purpose, China possesses sophisticated cyber 
capabilities and has demonstrated a striking level of perseverance, evidenced by 
the sheer number of attacks and acts of espionage that the country commits. 
Since cyber warfare is not directly addressed in unclassified Chinese government 
documents, it is useful to explore the PLA’s approach to information warfare 
(IW).103 
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a. Information Confrontation Framework 
Information is seen as a strategic resource, and the side that is best 
informed will win. Krekel, Adams and Bakos argue, “Authoritative PLA writings on 
computer network operations typically focus on issues such as the dominating 
the seizure of information during a campaign, shaping adversary perceptions for 
maximum strategic impact, operating or training under informationized 
conditions, or strengthening the PLA’s network defenses.”104 China’s aggressive 
collection efforts appear to be intended to amass data that will support the 
country’s economic growth, scientific and technological capacities and military 
power. Their collection effort aims to secure China’s strategic advantage in 
relation to competitor countries and adversaries well before any form of hostility 
has broken out. China is seeking a position where they simply have information 
superiority, an advantage that is reinforced by the fact that PLA has both a 
doctrine and a concept of operations. 
b. Cyber Integrated into People’s War Concept 
A holistic approach to information superiority within the PLA 
leadership encompasses more than just operational active duty units. The 
priorities have resulted in transforming the PLA’s traditional forms of mobilization 
and civil-military integration. It is named “People’s War in a New Era.” 
Consequently, the modernization of the militia and reserve forces is largely 
focused on recruiting new members with skills in essential high technology areas, 
in part to form new units but also to help transform existing militia or reserve units 
by incorporating recruits with advanced education and technical skills in mission 
critical areas.105  
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c. Cyber Operations Seen as Low-Cost Asymmetric 
Method 
The Chinese main doctrine on cyber war strategy advocates for a 
combination of cyber and electronic warfare capabilities in the early stages of 
conflict to paralyze enemy control and command and intelligence centers. The 
PLA’s view is that a highly developed IW capability can act as an asymmetric tool 
to neutralize the military capabilities of a technologically superior opponent.106 
Another interesting take on the use of cyber operations is the ability to settle a 
controversy without physically attacking the opponent. An important realization is 
that deterrence and offense can be conducted simultaneously in IW, staging an 
attack in an effort to induce the adversary to expend valuable resources during a 
crisis on difficult issues of determining attribution. It can be assumed that tactics 
used in coordination with other assets can contribute to a PLA bloodless victory 
using largely IW based tools.107  
d. Espionage Considered Acceptable 
China’s cyber operations in support of espionage operations has 
opened a source of previously inaccessible information that can be mined both in 
support of national security concerns and, more significantly, for national 
economic development. Cyber operations has in many ways replaced human 
intelligence (HUMINT), the spy is digital.108 China is believed to be one of the 
most aggressive actors in the world of cyber-espionage and is regularly accused 
of stealing industrial and technological secrets.109 Parts of this “success” can be 
attributed to an overall strategy but also as importantly to central management. 
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C. THE ROLE OF PLA GENERAL STAFF  
The Chinese have adopted a formal IW strategy called “Integrated 
Network Electronic Warfare” (INEW), which consolidates the offensive mission 
for both computer network attack (CNA) and EW under PLA General Staff 
Department’s (GSD) 4th Department (Electronic Countermeasures). The 
computer network defense (CND) and intelligence gathering responsibilities likely 
belong to the GSD 3rd Department (Signals Intelligence), and possibly to a 
variety of the PLA’s specialized IW militia units.110 An overview of the PLA 
military organization’s structure is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  PLA military organization.111 
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Exercise and training in cyber operations occurs across all PLA service 
branches and is considered a core competence of all combat units. Field 
exercises include joint operations in “complex electromagnetic environments,” 
and sources indicate the existence of a permanent “Blue Force” regiment, drilled 
in foreign IW tactics. Actions that confirm comprehensive planning, training and 
execution are only possible in an organization where responsibility and powers 
are clearly defined.112  
a. PLA and Hackers 
Government efforts to recruit and support individuals among the 
Chinese hacker community and evidence of consulting relationships between 
known elite freelance hackers and security services indicate some government 
willingness to draw from this pool of expertise and talent.113  
According to an uncorroborated Taiwan media source referencing 
an article from a Sichuan University student newspaper, the PLA in 2005 
reportedly held a series of regional or provincial hacker competitions to identify 
talented civilians who could support military cyber operations requirements.114 
Another group of hackers are the “hacktivists,” occasionally called 
‘‘patriotic hackers,’’ who appear to act primarily on the basis of nationalistic 
sentiments, often engaging in Distributed Denial of Service/Denial of Service 
attacks or website defacements. Hacktivists often target decision-makers directly 
to express their dissatisfaction with various policies.115 
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b. PLA’s Sponsorship of Universities  
It is a well-developed cooperation between government, military 
and commercial companies across the country, these technical programs, 
research, curricula and financial support helps to develop IW capabilities. The 
network of institutions and scholars funded to conduct research on IW techniques 
and technologies suggesting a continuing expansion of high-tech separate 
communities into niche areas of the national economy, such as finance, 
education, and law.116 
2. Expenditure 
In March 5, 2013, Beijing announced a 10.7 percent increase in its annual 
military budget to $114 billion, continuing more than two decades of sustained 
increases in annual defense spending. Estimating China’s Actual Military 
Expenditures using 2012 prices and exchange rates, the DoD estimates that 
China’s total actual military-related expenditure for 2012 falls between $135 
billion and $215 billion.117 
How much goes to the cyber is uncertain, and the numbers are not public. 
Defense Tech analyst Kevin Coleman estimated in 2008 that China spent $55 
million on its cyber budget.118  
3. Cyber Attacks and Espionage from China 
China’s desire for status has meant that they may have the most 
extensive and aggressive cyber warfare capability in the world. “Authoritative 
Chinese writings on the subject presented cyber warfare as an obvious 
asymmetric instrument for balancing overwhelming power, especially in case of 
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open conflict, but also as a deterrent.”119 In contemporary Chinese thinking, IW is 
seen as a preemptive tool on equal basis with other combat arms. Doctrinal and 
strategic writings underline the importance of seizing information dominance at 
an early stage and thereby exploiting the use of IW tools for their potential 
deterrent effect.120  
4. Cyber Operations Conducted by the PLA 
China’s development of its computer network operations capability 
extends beyond preparations for wartime operations. The PLA and state security 
organizations have begun employing this capability to mount a large-scale 
computer network exploitation effort for intelligence gathering purposes against 
the U.S. and many other countries around the world, according to statements by 
U.S. officials, accusations by targeted foreign governments, and a growing body 
of media reporting on these incidents.121 The following two examples show both 
the scope and the objectives. 
a. Titan Rain 
In 2003, Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractor 
computers were attacked with aim to copy sensitive data files. The cyber 
espionage attack apparently went undetected for many months. The cyber 
espionage attacks apparently went undetected for many months. DoD suspected 
that this series of cyber attacks, later labeled Titan Rain, originated in China. 
Although no classified systems were breached, many files containing sensitive 
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information were copied.122 In the case of Titan Rain, Chinese sources were 
estimated to have exfiltrated somewhere close to 10 terabits of data.123 
b. APT 1 
APT 1 is believed to be the Second Bureau of the People’s 
Liberation Army General Staff Department’s (GSD) Third Department, which is 
most commonly known by its Military unit Cover Designator (MuCD) as Unit 
61398. The nature of Unit 61398’s work is considered by China to be a state 
secret; however, the unit is believed to engage in cyber exploitation. Based on 
the size of Unit 61396’s physical infrastructure, the staff is estimated to be 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people. APT 1 has systematically stolen 
hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141 organizations and has 
demonstrated the capability and intent to steal from dozens of organizations 
simultaneously, including one victim in Norway.124  
D. SUMMARY 
Chinese leaders have shown foresight with regards to priorities, focus, 
and a desire to exploit new technology. China has a well-developed strategy 
combined with cyber resources across the government, including civilian IT 
companies and universities. China has had huge economic growth, and its 
budget reflects the overall growth in the state economy. Cyber power is a priority 
and the country’s armed forces have a major role. Technology and development 
are other priority areas where the government supports an extensive espionage 
program in cyberspace. PLA appears to be a trendsetter in terms of how a 
government can organize its activities in cyberspace. In recent years, China has 
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executed numerous advanced and effective cyber espionage programs. With 
ATP 1, China demonstrated its ability to exploit weaknesses in cyber defenses, 
thereby collecting large amounts of intelligence.  
A nation that focuses on cyber weapons can thereby achieve deterrence 
in the cyber domain. Simply put, if any country challenges China in cyberspace, it 
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V. NORWEGIAN CYBER DEFENSES 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides an understanding of how Norwegian cyber defenses 
are organized and their strategies and compares them to Finnish cyber security 
strategy. In many ways Finland is similar to Norway, especially in relation to 
resources and technology; however, Finland has developed a very ambitious 
cyber strategy, which can be seen as an innovative model. 
Cyberspace is increasingly important for Norway and Finland. The Global 
Information Technology Report from 2012125 confirms that the Nordic countries 
and the Asian economies are well ahead in adapting and implementing 
information and communication technology. Sweden ranked first on the 
worldwide Networked Readiness Index (NRI). Finland was third followed by 
Denmark as fourth, and Norway achieved the seventh place putting the four 
Nordic countries into the top ten on the NRI.126 
Many states and organizations have begun to put money and research 
into their cyber security programs. Cyber weapons have become important tools 
of modern warfare. The attack on a cyber infrastructure as in Estonia has shown 
that cyberspace can be used to affect any nation. An important challenge for any 
cyber defense is the rapid changes in technologies, making it difficult for any 
state or organization to manage all developments in a timely manner. Attacks 
continue to affect operating systems, applications, communications protocols and 
networks. 
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B. NORWEGIAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY THINKING 
The experience gained by the swift Nazi occupation of Norway during 
WW2 led to a desire to form a total defense in 1946. The defense system 
included the nation’s total resources, both military combat power and civil 
preparedness. The aim of this approach was two secure Norway’s territory, 
independence and national values, and to safeguard the population. The concept 
responded to a need for ensuring a comprehensive effort by all sectors in the 
society in times of crisis and for avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort in 
such a small nation as Norway.127 
Some nations have an organization that maintains cyber defense, and in 
countries such as the UK and France, cross-government institutions, like the 
cabinet office, are often preferred for coordinating cyber defense. In Norway, one 
of the challenges was the question of where to place responsibilities for cyber 
defense, as cyber threats by nature cut across different sectors. The organization 
of the government, as well as the formerly mentioned principle of responsibility, 
imply that all Ministers are responsible for their own sector – also in the realm of 
cyber defense.128 This approach differs greatly from the one selected in China, 
where responsibilities and priorities seem much better coordinated. Although 
there are great differences between China and Norway, the challenges in relation 
to cyber defense are not so different. 
C. CYBER SECURITY IN A SMALL COUNTRY 
In relation to organizing a cyber defense, there is little point in comparing 
Norway with larger nations; however, Finland can provide a meaningful 
comparison. Finland has for many years been a leading country in 
telecommunications because of the presence of Nokia and has very ambitious 
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aspirations for its cyber defenses:129 “Finland has high ambitions in terms of 
cyber security with the goal to become the leading country in this area by 2016. 
Some of the principles in the national approach for Finland’s cyber 
security management: 
The approach for the implementation of cyber security is based on 
efficient and wide-ranging information-collection, an analysis and 
gathering system as well as common and shared situation 
awareness, and national and international cooperation in 
preparedness. To succeed in this approach, the establishment of a 
Cyber Security Centre as well as the development of 24/7 
information security arrangements for the entire society was 
required. 
Cyber security arrangements follow the division of duties between 
the authorities, businesses and organizations, in accordance with 
statutes and agreed cooperation. Rapid adaptability as well as the 
ability to seize new opportunities and react to unexpected situations 
demand strategic agility awareness and compliance from the actors 
as they keep developing and managing the measures, which are 
aimed at achieving cyber security. 
Cyber security is being constructed to meet its functional and 
technical requirements. In addition to national action, inputs are 
being made into international cooperation as well as participation in 
international R&D and exercises. The implementation of cyber 
security R&D and education at different levels does not only 
strengthen national expertise, but it also bolsters Finland as an 
information society.130  
Finland’s “level of readiness is first rate thanks to its world-class 
educational system, relatively inexpensive technologies, and excellent 
infrastructure.”131 The vision (of becoming leading country in the world by 2016) 
may sound optimistic, but the authors of the national document believe that 
Finland has a good chance of reaching the goal. Since WW2, security, 
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preparedness and self-sufficiency have been an important part of Finnish 
strategic priorities and national self-image.132 Thus, it is not surprising that 
Finland has the same ambitions in cyber security. Among the many innovative 
ideas in this document, four areas of interest should be emphasized: 
• Shared Situation Awareness  
• Establishment of the Cyber Security Centre  
• Strategic Agility  
• Participation in International R & D and Exercises 
These four areas could provide important improvements within the cyber 
defense of Norway if implemented; the challenge would be adapting the 
Norwegian model to such initiatives.  
D. NORWEGIAN CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 
A number of documents describe the Norwegian cyber defense strategy 
and the types of threats that are considered serious. The recently released 
“Strategy, Cyber Security Strategy for Norway” (December 2012) provides 
background, status and plans. The document describes how information and 
communications technology (ICT) has caused major changes to society over the 
past decades. Technology is the foundation for all interaction across the society, 
making ICT a strategic security challenge. An increased use of ICT has made 
society more vulnerable. Threats to ICT systems are on the rise, and attacks are 
increasingly more sophisticated. Therefore, good preventive information security 
is increasingly important for national security. Information security means that 
information is protected against unauthorized access, that it is available when 
needed, and that it is protected against unauthorized changes.133 Considerable 
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focus on information security and protection against unauthorized access might 
seem to be a narrow basis for a comprehensive approach to cyber security. 
The strategy document describes the threats as follows:  
Espionage and sabotage - a growing threat. The tendency to be 
targeted by professional hacking against critical ICT systems is 
increasing. Targeted espionage attacks against the vital national 
security interests now constitute a significant challenge. Civilian 
agencies, military units and private companies are subject to 
espionage and sabotage. Many states are developing the ability to 
conduct intelligence and warfare against critical infrastructure. It 
must be noted that sophisticated tamper and impact attacks will be 
directed at socially critical information resources, including 
computer systems that control industrial processes and critical 
infrastructure.134 
In another government document, a chart shows the number of ICT 
events in the period 2007‒2011. These are cases that are handled by NSM 
Department, Norwegian Computer Emergency Response Team (NorCERT). 
More and more ICT events have been recorded in Norway, and the number of 
cases has tripled from 2007 to 2011. 
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Figure 3.  Number of handled ICT events.135 
A more specific description of a possible threat is described in the 
Norwegian Intelligence Service’ (NIS) annual unclassified threat assessment. 
NIS writes that the Chinese authorities are overusing digital operations to a large 
degree as a replacement for human collection and often use proxies for obtaining 
information. Educational institutions, firms, organizations and hacker circles 
provide a good cover for the activity.136 This is an observation that matches well 
with the reality, as described in detail in Chapter IV.  
A preliminary conclusion is that the strategy document is very accurate in 
describing the threat, but measures can be seen as defensive and not very 
ambitious. The document makes no introduction to the concept of the cyber 
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domain, an important component to create an understanding of the complexity 
and a comprehensive approach.  
E. NORWEGIAN CYBER DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Departmental Responsibilities 
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is responsible for coordinating 
civilian security. The Ministry acts as initiator and coordinator with respect to 
other sectoral authorities.  
The Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs is 
responsible for coordinating government ICT policy. The Ministry has specific 
responsibility for promoting a stronger and more comprehensive approach to 
information security in the public administration. The Ministry is also responsible 
for improving coordination of work on information security by agencies and for 
contributing to coordinated solutions. 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications is, by virtue of its 
responsibility for the Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority, 
responsible for ICT security related to electronic communication networks and 
services.  
The Ministry of Defense is responsible for cyber security in the military 
sector, including preventive measures. The Ministry of Defense has management 
responsibility for the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) and 
administrative responsibility for the National Security Act. 
The defense sector comprises the Ministry of Defense and all subordinate 
agencies: the Armed Forces, the Norwegian Defense Estates Agency, the 
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI) and the Norwegian National 
Security Authority (NSM).137 
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2. Organizations and Responsibilities 
Despite the fact that Norway is a small country with limited resources, a 
number of organizations are responsible for cyber security. The following 
agencies have a responsibility to protect Norway against cyber threats: 
a. The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) 
NSM is the central directorate for the protection of information and 
infrastructure crucial for critical societal functions. It protects information, 
information systems and other assets against espionage, sabotage, and 
terrorism through inspections in accordance with the Security Act; it develops 
security initiatives, provides advice and guidance, and detects and manages 
countermeasures for serious cyber attacks (see NorCERT later in this chapter). It 
is the driving force for improving security conditions.138 
The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) is the executive 
body for preventive security in the civil and military sectors on behalf of the 
Ministry of Justice and the Police and the Ministry of Defense. The NSM counters 
threats to the independence and security of the realm and other vital national 
security interests, primarily espionage, sabotage or acts of terrorism. The NSM is 
a directorate that is administratively subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.139 
b. NorCERT  
NorCERT, a department under the NSM, is the national center for 
notification and countermeasure coordination for serious cyber attacks and other 
ICT security incidents targeting important ICT infrastructure for critical societal 
functions.140 NorCERT is Norway’s national center for issuing alerts on and 
                                            
138 FAD, “Cyber Security Strategy for Norway,” December 17, 2012, 31.  
139 Forsvarsdepartementet [Norwegian Ministry of Defence], Meld. St. 14 (2012–2013) 
Kompetanse for en ny tid [The Ministry of Defence: Competence for a new era, White paper no. 
14 (2012–2013)], 12, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/38247066/PDFS/STM201220130014000DDDPDFS.pdf 
(accessed September 13, 2012). 
140 FAD, “Cyber Security Strategy for Norway,” December 17, 2012, 30.  
 59 
coordinating responses to serious cyber attacks. The Norwegian Alert and Early 
Warning System for Digital Infrastructure gives authorities capabilities to verify 
and issue alerts on serious and coordinated attacks on critical ICT infrastructure. 
NorCERT participates in the Nordic CERT (Computer Emergency Response 
Team) partnership and cooperates closely with counterparts in other countries.  
c. The Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority 
(PT) 
PT monitors companies providing electronic communications 
services, electronic communications networks and postal services, and issuers of 
official eSignature certificates. PT contributes to secure and robust networks and 
services.141 
d. The Norwegian Centre for Information Security (NorSIS) 
NorSIS is a resource center created through an initiative by the 
Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs The center 
offers consultancy services for information security for all Norwegian private and 
public entities. All levels of society can take advantage of these services. NorSIS 
also runs the website deleteme.no (slettmeg.no), which gives advice to those 
who feel offended online.142 
e. Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) 
DSB is the driver, advisor and coordinator for preventive and crisis 
measures nationally, regionally and locally. It has the  capacity to supply aid to 
support higher authorities and all other authorities in the event of major 
emergencies or when needed.143 
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f. The Norwegian Data Protection Authority (DT) 
DT oversees a number of laws and regulations, where information 
security is an important part of the regulation. The overall regulatory framework 
affects much of the public and private sectors.   DT has developed a number of 
guidelines on information security and provides guidance on compliance with 
legislated requirements.144 
g. Kripos (National Criminal Investigation Service) 
The main objective of Kripos is to combat organized and other 
serious crime.145 Kripos is about to change its organizational structure to meet 
the challenges it faces with an increased focus on cyber. The new department, 
“Technology and Operational Services” provides analysis, technology and 
research support, including evidence recovery, method development and 
assistance to the Norwegian police.146 
In selected areas, Kripos will be the main provider of services and 
act as a center of expertise in subjects and methods. It also serves as the 
international contact point and the forensic laboratory.147 
h. Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) 
NIS is responsible for detecting and analyzing external threats to 
Norway. The objective of intelligence activities is to contribute to counteract 
threats and to provide Norwegian authorities with a solid basis for foreign, 
security and defense policy decisions.148 
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In 1998, the Storting (The Parliament) passed the Public Act for the 
NIS. 
The NIS shall collect, evaluate, and analyze information concerning 
Norwegian interests in relation to foreign countries, organizations, 
and individuals. With this platform, it will compile threat warnings 
and intelligence estimates, to the extent it can contribute to 
securing the vital interests of the society.149 
A Royal Instruction followed the Public Act in 2001 and stated: “The 
MoD can establish procedures to ensure communication and cooperation with 
other ministries and institutions that require information obtained from the 
Service.”150 
In Norway, the NIS produces all-source products, compiled from 
different collection assets. Technical collection and evaluation of data and human 
intelligence (HUMINT) is organized within the NIS. This means that NIS has both 
legislative and organizational authority that facilitates an active use of 
organizational resources in the cyber domain. According to current records of the 
national budget for 2013, the NIS was allocated NoK 1115 million (US$ 192 
million).151 
Cooperation between the Norwegian Intelligence Service and the 
Norwegian Police Security Service has become increasingly close in the post– 
9/11 era. In October 2006, the government passed Royal Instructions for 
extended cooperation between the two services. This means that the practical 
cooperation between NIS and the Norwegian Police Security Service is one of 
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few examples of collaboration across the responsible ministries and government 
agencies. 
i. Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) 
PST is Norway’s civilian domestic intelligence and security services 
and is, consequently, responsible for the nation’s internal security. PST is part of 
the police but reports directly to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. PST’s 
primary task is, as stated by the Police Act, to prevent and investigate crimes 
against national security. More precisely, this includes preventing and detecting 
espionage, terrorism/politically motivated violence, the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction, material and technology for the production of such weapons 
and threats against officials. This requires the service to use a variety of methods 
for prevention and preventive work, necessitating extensive cooperation with 
other countries’ security services. The focus is on the collection of information 
about people and groups that may pose a threat, preparation of various analyzes 
and threat assessments, investigations and other operational measures and 
counseling. 
PST also has an advisory role to the government and other 
Norwegian authorities, for such activities as preparing PST threat assessments 
as part of efforts to safeguard the Norwegian state’s security and independence. 
The Ministry of Justice determines if the PST shall be given 
responsibility for fighting organized crime, crimes against humanity, genocide, 
and aggravated war crimes.152 According to open sources, PST was allocated 
NKR 525 million (US$ 90.5 million) in 2012.153 
A new counter-terrorism center has been established in PST. To 
best facilitate this effort, the government has decided that it will establish a joint 
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counter-terrorism center in PST. The center will be staffed with personnel from 
both PST and NIS.154 
j. The Cyber Defense 
The Norwegian Armed Forces’ ability to meet the cyber threat was 
strengthened in 2012 with the creation of The Cyber Defense. The main task of 
cyber defense is to operate and develop military communications and support 
military operations both at home and abroad. Cyber Defense supports network-
based operations and contributes to significant improvements in interoperability, 
flexibility, responsiveness, mobility and deployability. Within current budget limits, 
the Cyber Defense can adapt the organization and tasks in accordance with the 
structural changes that are made in other parts of the military.155 
An overview of the ministries and agencies responsible for cyber 
defense in Norway is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Norwegian Cyber Defense Ministries and Agencies. 
This organization is not specific to Norway, and many countries, 
including Finland, have a similar sharing of responsibilities. In a country with 
limited resources, this organizational plan might not be appropriate. In China, the 
PLA has an apparent role in the design, planning and execution of operations in 
the cyber domain. A central organization with executive command in cyber 
defense seems to be an effective way of organizing.  
F. NORWAY’S GOALS AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 
The Government has identified four overarching goals for information 
security. None of these overarching information security goals is more important 
than another, and they are mutually dependent success factors. 
1.  Better coordination and common situational understanding 
2.   Robust and secure ICT infrastructure for everyone 
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3.  Good ability to handle adverse ICT events 
4.   High level of competence and security156 
These overarching goals will be operationalized through seven strategic 
priorities:  
• Ensure a more comprehensive and systematic approach to 
information security 
• Improve ICT infrastructure 
• Ensure a common approach to information security in public 
administration 
• Safeguard society’s ability to detect, alert and handle serious ICT 
incidents 
• Safeguard society’s ability to prevent, detect and investigate cyber 
crime 
• Raise awareness and competence 
• Provide high quality national research and development in the field 
of information security157 
The Government will follow up this strategy with specific measures in an 
action plan, which will be published separately.158 The strategic document 
describes how Norway must be in a constant state of proactive operational 
preparedness in order to prevent, detect and coordinate reactions to serious ICT 
incidents. Relevant authorities and organizations are supposed to work in close 
collaboration, with special emphasis on working with those parts of the private 
sector that own or operate infrastructure. This collaboration must address both 
intentional and unintentional events, such as technical or human error, accidents, 
or natural disasters. 
Furthermore, cyber criminals should not be able to plan or execute crimes 
without a significant risk of being detected and prosecuted. Society’s ability to 
prevent, detect and investigate cyber crime must be prioritized. All stakeholders 
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should, on their own initiative, implement crime prevention measures in their own 
organizations and seek to minimize losses or damage as a result of cyber crime. 
Public authorities shall achieve this through increased expertise, and by 
improving specialist expertise and the skills of police generalists. The police must 
make this a priority and increase their capacity to prevent, detect and investigate 
cyber crime. Public authorities will continue to increase their capacity in this field 
in order to detect cyber crime that directly or indirectly may have an impact on 
national security or vital national interests.159 
Many of the strategic priorities may seem obvious and the overall 
objectives are centered on protection and safety. A number of important issues 
are identified, but it is difficult to see clear guidance on how to meet the 
challenges. There are a number of correct assumptions, but where the document 
on the one side refers to the somewhat vague “relevant authorities,” on the other 
side, it is specific about the police who must increase their capacities. The 
strategic document appears with many good ideas and plans, but there is no 
overarching department or agency that can implement the plans. In relation to 
the four areas of interest in the Finnish strategy, Norway seems to have the 
same focus on “Shared Situation Awareness,” “Cyber Security Centre” and 
“Participation in International R & D and Exercises.”   However, it is difficult to 
find anything about “Strategic Agility” in the Norwegian document. This is 
perhaps the weakness of the Norwegian strategy, i.e., although four ministries 
have signed the document, it does not strengthen strategic direction. 
G. SUMMARY 
A review of Norway’s cyber security strategy shows in all essence that the 
government has prepared a good document for its purpose. It is clear in the 
description of the threat, and it describes a number of good measures; however,  
it gives no definition of the cyber domain. The focus is on defense and protective 
                                            
159 Ibid., 20–22. 
 67 
initiatives without acknowledging the broader aspects of cyberspace. Norway has 
a good strategy for information security, but lacks a strategy for cyber security. 
Regarding organization, coordinating Norway’s cyber defenses is a 
challenge, although a joint analysis unit has been established between PST and 
NIS. The fact that all four ministries have responsibilities that border the cyber 
domain increases the likelihood of problems with regard to coordination and 
decision-making. The organization is not optimal with respect to both leadership 
and resource allocation when four different ministries are to both lead and fund 
an activity they share with others.  
The importance of the Ministry of Defense should be more significant, at 
the expense of the other departments. Norway’s cyber defenses are small, 
consisting of three main intelligence and security services, one military 
organization and five agencies with specialist responsibility. This structuring 
makes the Norwegian cyber defenses scattered with subsequent risk of areas 
that lack coordination and responsibility. A key premise is that the NIS and the 
Cyber Defense are already subordinated to the Minister of Defense; NSM is also 
partially under the same ministry. Thus, three key players are already organized 
under the same minister.  
The criteria for an effective cyber defense are the joint exploitation of 
national resources across civil and military sphere, unconventional methods and 
a highly professional environment.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN IMPROVED NORWEGIAN 
CYBER SECURITY APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents criteria for an ideal and successful holistic approach 
to cyber security for the Norwegian Government and identifies current shortfalls.  
B. SUMMARY 
Chapters II and III of this thesis argue that cyberspace has opened up a 
new channel through which states can project power and that cyber power is a 
real force multiplier for those who have the ability to exercise such power. Cyber 
power is different from other powers because so many players can exercise it 
and the opportunities to attack an opponent are many, given that there are no 
clear boundaries between war and peace. This means that those who have the 
will, resources and access, whether they are individuals, groups or states, have a 
unique source of power. 
Chapter IV of this thesis argues that China can be seen as an example of 
a state that is actively using cyberspace for espionage and as a means of 
deterrence. China has a coherent strategy and sufficient funds; it is training a 
significant number of hackers who work for the state. China’s technological focus 
gives a hint of what is possible to achieve if a nation realizes the potential of 
cyberspace and illustrates how cyber power can support strategic objectives. 
Chapter V of this thesis argues that in many respects, Norway’s cyber 
defenses are modern and updated, but that the Norwegian cyber strategy is both 
narrow and relatively unambitious. The government has opted for a defensive 
information security strategy, and it is difficult to find any recognition of 
cyberspace as a domain of conflict in the official documents. 
The thesis set out to examine how Norway can best counter threats in 
cyberspace. In Chapter V, the thesis explores the current status of Norwegian 
cyber strategy and defenses and concludes that Norway has focused scattered 
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resources on defensive measures. Norway has no coherent strategy for 
cyberspace and for how this domain can be used to establish national strategies. 
An effective way to counter threats in cyberspace is a joint exploitation of 
national resources across the civil and military spheres, unconventional methods 
and a highly professional environment. This assertion forms the basis for the 
recommendations made in this thesis. 
C. CHALLENGES  
In Norway, the focus on cyber security has gained increasing attention, 
and the central authorities have published updated doctrines and strategies. The 
regular cyber attacks against Norwegian authorities and companies are 
mentioned in the newspapers, while the military cyber defense leadership is 
steadily improving the promotion of their field of responsibility. The challenge in 
relation to cyber defense, however, is the sector division that has characterized 
the Norwegian government. This division has obvious weaknesses in relation to 
situational awareness and in distribution of resources as well as command and 
control. The fact that four ministers sign a strategy can be seen as a sign of 
strength, but what it really says is that no one has complete responsibility and 
that it is unclear who will be the stakeholder during a crisis. This weakness has 
already been pointed out in the aforementioned Vulnerability Committee report 
from 2000, which suggested a separate emergency ministry: “Collection of 
responsibility for civil protection and emergency preparedness in a ministry that 
has this as primary task.”160 
This is the de facto structural division of responsibility in the Norwegian 
public administration and is unlikely to change any time soon, so it may be 
important to look at what can be done within the current organization. 
                                            




These proposals, extending from the strategic to the tactical level, are not 
ranked according to importance. The purpose is to point out some specific areas 
of improvement that can help Norway to better counter threats in cyberspace. 
1. Offensive versus Defensive Posture for Norway 
Most countries have prepared for cyber war. Most nations, however, seem 
to keep the defensive posture. As discussed in previous chapters, it is 
paradoxical that attacking is both simple and effective in cyberspace. One 
possible explanation is that there is no clear distinction between war and peace 
in cyberspace. This means that most operations can be termed defensive while, 
in reality, they may be offensive. For small countries, it is possible that the 
perception of warfare means that they, by default, manage their resources 
defensively. It is a simple and uncontroversial solution. 
Offensive cyber capability requires a continuous process of collecting 
vulnerabilities, creating exploits, platforms and warheads, and building a network 
of deniable hosts on the Internet to maintain the secrecy of the operator. Since 
these are low-cost operations (in comparison to kinetic military capabilities), it 
can be argued that these preparations should be made even if the current 
doctrine does not include the use of offensive cyber capabilities.161 
A proactive approach to operations in cyberspace would likely result in a 
change in attitude and would require political decision-makers to be aware of the 
consequences. The advantages of such an approach, given that it becomes 
public knowledge, are that the nation would be seen as a serious and tough 
player in cyberspace. Norway is likely to have both the technology and resources 
to conduct offensive cyber operations; the question is, therefore, a political trade-
                                            
161 Timo Kiravuo and Mikko Särelä, “The Care and Maintenance of Cyberweapons,” 227 in 
The Fog of Cyber Defence, ed. Jari Rantapelkonen & Mirva Salminen (Helsinki: National Defence 
University, 2013). 
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off. The alternative is to focus on defense alone, thus avoiding any 
inconvenience with other nations.  
However, Norway should establish an offensive cyber capability. This 
would not only complement the cyber defense, but it would also create a new 
dimension where threats, whether by individuals, groups or nations, could be 
actively contested. As described in Chapter Three, cyber power and cyber war 
can be analyzed in several ways, from which it should be possible to develop 
appropriate strategies for Norway. 
2. Cross-Boundary Information Sharing 
The complexity of cyberspace and the current Norwegian organization 
make it difficult to establish a common shared situational awareness. This may 
change by sharing information across government, agencies and civilian actors. 
In anticipation of organizational changes, a change in guidelines for classification 
should be considered. This would allow a selected sample of key players in both 
government and private business (after security clearance) to receive classified 
information and classified assessments.  
3. Unified Command and Control 
Although there are structural reasons for how responsibility and power is 
divided between ministries in Norway, a future goal should be unified 
management of cyber defense. Such a “cyber command/cyber security centre” 
would probably be able to coordinate Norway’s military and civilian sectors. As 
shown in Chapter Five, in Norway, responsibilities in cyberspace are divided 
among four ministries and eight agencies. An important first step would be to 
make one ministry responsible for the nation’s cyber efforts. This should be the 
Ministry of Defense (MoD), given that it has the necessary skills for crisis 
management and that key institutions such as NIS, NSM and Cyber Defense are 
already subordinated to the Ministry. It is also an important point that are no 
distinction between war and peace in cyberspace, something to countless 
offensive operations between both individuals, groups and nations shows. 
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Operations in this new domain will likely favor the one who masters the art of war 
and operational planning in the traditional domains; this also indicates that the 
MoD should take the lead this sector.  
4. Frontline Technology and a Professional Environment 
ICT depends on innovation, expertise and speed in development circles. 
Norway has access to the relevant technology environments, but a challenge 
would be to invest adequately in future technologies. This must be achieved 
through a combination of education and cultivation of creative and technologically 
strong and adaptable environments including international R & D. China has 
solved this challenge by investing in universities. Government investments would 
ensure that research is financially supported and both government and industry 
would take the lead of innovation. All students and many professors would work 
partly for the state’s interests, something that should be possible in a country like 
Norway where so many are already working for the state. The government must 
show strategic agility by utilizing the ability to adjust and adapt to new innovative 
ideas and use those ideas to create new products and services that enhance the 
cyber defense. 
5. The Power of Deterrence 
Another philosophy of cyber defense is to focus on deterrence. Even for a 
small nation, a policy based on deterrence can be effective. During the Cold War, 
Norway’s armed forces were not far from the border with the Soviet Union. 
Norwegian forces were significantly weaker than the Soviets’, but the presence 
and willingness to fight sent a strong signal. Translated into a modern language 
and adapted to cyberspace, it is conceivable that the Finnish model is a modern 
version of such thinking. As mentioned above, Finland has a national goal of 
becoming the world’s leading country in cyber security; even without going into 
details, this sends a strong signal of will.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Two factors necessitate this study. First, Norway has a strategic 
infrastructure that remains largely tied to the nation’s oil and gas industry. This 
generates revenue that is essential to ensure the country’s future growth and 
prosperity. Second, there seems to be a general understanding that the 
importance of cyberspace is increasing and that other nations are investing 
heavily to both exploit and defend their cyber domain. Acknowledging these 
challenges would streamline the use of existing Norwegian technology, strategy 
and funding, while allowing for investments in innovation, development and new 
command and control structures; these aspects that are crucial to a small country 
with limited resources. 
Finally, cyber security is not only about technology and innovation. 
Culture, norms, organizational design and legislation are important to cyber 
security. These topics must be discussed, agreed upon and implemented in co-
operation among decision makers, ministers, the police and intelligence 
agencies, the armed forces and other governmental agencies. Freer thinking 
about cyberspace would make Norway more open to new ideas for both defense 
and security.  
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